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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FIRST OF DENVER MORTGAGE
INVESTORS; and CITIBANK, N.A.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
C. N. ZUNDEL AND ASSOCIATES, a
limited partnership; MOUNTAIN
SPRINGS CONSTRUCTION COMPANY OF
UTAH, a Utah corporation;
MOUNTAIN SPRINGS CONSTRUCTION
COMPANY, a California corporation; F. D. ASHDOWN and
ALFRETTA ASHDOWN, Trustees;
FMA LEASING COMPANY; DUNCAN
ELECTRIC SUPPLY, INC.; HOLTWITMER INTERIORS, et al.,

Case No. 15696

Defendants and Respondents-

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, BLAND BROS., INC.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action in which the respondents sought
foreclosure against real property known as the Lakeview Terrace
Subdivision in Davis County, Utah, pursuant to mechanic's liens,
and appellant sought foreclosure against said property upon the
basis of a Trust Deed.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The trial court granted the !-lotions for Summary Judgment of the respondents, adjudging that they had first priority
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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against said subdivision in the total sum of $44,732.86 and
adjudging that appellant had second priority against said
property.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower court's Summary
Judgment awarding respondents priority in the sum of $44,732.86.
Respondent, Bland. Bros., Inc., seeks to have the ruling of the
lower court sustained on appeal, and seeks to have the appeal
dismissed as being moot and premature.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In large measure, the appellant's rather lengthy Statement of Facts is not supported by the record.
from a Summary Judgment (R.618)

Appellant appeals

in favor of respondents.

There

was no evidentiary hearing, and thus there is no "evidence" on
the question of the location, extent and other circumstances of
the respondents' work on the project.

Appellant itself admits

this work to a considerable extent, and che lower court undoubtedly felt that those admissions, together with the deposition
referred to hereafter,were sufficient for its ruling.

If the

Supreme Court feels that the location, extent and circumstances
of respondents' work have not been sufficiently developed, then
of course a trial will be required.
The sole issue raised by appellant's brief is Nhether
or not the lower court committed error in granting the respondents
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a first priority on the basis of labor and materials furnished
and performed by respondent, Child Bros., Inc., commencing on
November 15, 1973, which was approximately three months prior to
the recording of appellant's Trust Deed on the 19th day of February,
vant.

1974.

All facts dealing with other subjects are irrele-

It should also be noted that the deposition of Eugene

Child, a principal in the defendant,
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Child Bros., Inc., was published at the hearing on the
respective motions for Summary Judgment (Tr.75).

Respondent,

Bland Bros., Inc., further claims that the appeal is moot and
should therefore be dismissed, and facts relating to that claim
will be briefly set forth.
In appellant's brief at page 8, appellant admits that
respondent, Child Bros., Inc., "laid water line and sewer pipe
for the subdivision, commencing its first work on November 15,
1973."

In the brief of appellant (plaintiff below)

in support

of his motion for summary judgment, the admission is made (R.SlOI:
"The Defendant, Child Bros., Inc., was employed by the original
owner, C. N. Zundel and Associates, to provide sanitary sewer,
storm drain and water system for the Lakeview Terrace
The first work was performed on November 15, 1973."
brief, appellant admits

Subdivisio.~.

In that sa.'ne

(R. 511) that respondent, Bland Bros., Inc.,

"furnished landscaping services on the common areas of Phase l
(the first ten townhouse units)
Unit Development."

of Lakeview Terrace, a Planned

And again in said brief (R. 514) appellant

admits: "The lien claimant, Bland Bros.

Inc., is a landscaper

who provided landscaping including sprinkler system and related
i terns in the common area of Lakeview Terrace, Phase Two·:
thus concedes that respondent, Bland Bros., Inc.,

Appellan:

perfo~ed

ser-

vices in both Phase l and Phase 2 of Lakeview Terrace, Nhich
constitute

a substantial part of the subdivision.

The

re~ord

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-4-

nowhere shows that that is the only area in which Bland Bros.,
Inc., performed services.

Likewise the record does not disclose

that the other lien claimants performed services exclusively in
that area, although appellant so asserts.

Eugene Child, in his

deposition at page 55, stated that a lot of his work pertained
to the entire subdivision.

He stated it in the following phrase:

"But a lot of it pertained to the whole project there."
In appellant's brief, he admits that the original owner
of the subdivision was a limited partnership known as C. N. Zundel
and Associates (see page 1 of appellant's brief).

On page 2 of

said brief the appellant admits that the property was conveyed by
the limited partnership to the defendant, Mountain Springs Construction Company, a Utah corporation, and that "The stockholders
of Mountain Springs were the same individuals (with the exception
of

c.

N. Zundel) as the limited partners , . . "
The amounts of the liens, including interest and attor-

neys'

fees of the various respondents are conceded by the appellant

(see page 5 of appellant's brief).
On December 8, 1977, at a hearing in this matter before
the lower court, stipulation was entered into by the parties, and
a Minute Entry for that date states the following

(R.443):

"Counsel and parties have met and reached stipulations which are stated into the record.
Plaintiff will
take a decree of foreclosure for one million nine hundred
thousand dollars, and there will be no deficiency judgment
taken.
Plaintiff waives the six percent penalty figure on
redemption and will pay thirty thousand more for liens,
plus anything necessary for maintenance and repair."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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See

~1inute

Entry of Dec. 12, 1977, to the same effect (R.453).

The Motions for Summary Judgment were set for hearing for the
12th of January, 1978, and the matter was set for trial for
February 1, 1978.

Thus, in short, appellant agreed to accept

one million nine hundred thousand dollars, take no deficiency
judgment, and the matter of priority between the appellant and
respondents was reserved.

Thereafter on December 20, 1978,

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law (R.481) and a Judgment and
(R. 637).
Decree of Foreclosure (R.488) and an Order of Sale were entered.
In the Conclusions of Law (R.485), it states:
"4.
Plaintiffs have Stipulated in open court that
they shall bid only the sum of one million nine hundred
thousand for saig-property and take no deficiency judrnent
against the defendant, Mountain Springs Construction Company nor against any of the individual guarantors."
(emphasis added.)
In the Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (R.489),
it states:
"The priority of' the mechanic's and materialmen's
liens is reserved for future determination and shall be
set forth in a supplemental Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure to be entered prior to Sheriff's Sale."
and again it states:
. . that the proceeds of sale be applied in
payment of the sheriff's cost of sale and thereafter
to the parties in accordance with the priority to be
determined by the court;
The aforesaid Order of Sale set the Sheriff's Sale for January
19, 1978.

The ruling on the

~lotions

for Summary Judgment did

not take place until January 24, 1978.

On January 16, 1973, thE

trial judge entered a Memorandum Decision in which he ordered
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that the sale should take place on January 19, 1978, as scheduled,
but ordered that:
the proceeds from said sale be submitted
immediately to the Court to be held until such time as
a decision is made in the entire matter after the submission of Briefs, due as previously ordered by the
Court,on January 23, 1978." (R.569}
The Sheriff's Sale took place on January 19th and the appellant
bid for the property one million nine hundred thousand dollars
(R. 642}.
On January 24, 1978, the Court entered a Memorandum
Decision awarding the respondents first priority over the appel!ant, and that ruling encompassed total liens in the amount of
$37,397.42.

(R.614}

The aforesaid Memorandum Decision was entered as a
final order entitled Order Granting Summary Judgment and Order
Amending Certificate of Sale on February 1, 1978.

(R.618}

In addition to awarding the respondents the total judgments of
$37,397.42, at the request of the appellant, the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was amended to show that plaintiff's bid for the
property is the sum of $1,937,397.42 (R.619}.

The said Order

was prepared by the appellant, who admitted in a prior hearing
in this matter before the Supreme Court that the amendment was at
his request.

By Order entered on February 16, 1978, at the request

of the appellant (P.628), b1e appellant's bid was amended again,
and that Order states:
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"It is ordered that the Sheriff's certificate of
Sale shall be amended to show that plaintiff's bid for
the property is the sum of $1,944,732.86."
This amendment was requested to cover the award of a further
to Holt-Witmer Interiors,

lie~

Inc.

On February 22, 1978, an Amended Order of Decision was
entered, which states in part:
"It is hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that
the material and labor liens duly and adequately filed
are as follows: Duncan Electric Company in the sum of
$4,310.70; Robert J. Wardrop, in the sum of $2,367.37;
Countertop Shop, Inc., $790.43; Max D. Scheel, $729.53;
Ronald Graham Tile Company, $3,460.40; Bland Bros., Inc.,
$12,289.47; Child Bros., Inc., $13,450.52; Holt-Witmer
Interiors, Inc., $7,335.44; said amount being $44,732.86.
"Based upon the Amended Order executed by the aboveentitled Court, the amount required to be paid in order
for redemption of the property shall be $1,944,732.86.
All other portions of the prior orders and decisions
shall remain in full force and effect, except as modified herein." (R.629-630)
On February 24, 1978, plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal
appealing from the Order of February l, 1978.
from the Order of February 22, 1978.

No appeal was ta:<e:.

(R.63l)

Appellant has paid no sum \.,'hatever to the Sheriff of
Davis County, and no sum has been paid into the court pursuant :c
the aforesaid foreclosure sales.

During the redemption period,

appellant's counsel indicated numerous time to counsel for this
respondent that a redemption appeared likely which would provide
sufficient funds to pay appellant and

responden~s.

possibility did not materialize, and prior to the expiration
the redemption period, this respondent filed a Pet1tion

~1th
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lower court to Vacate the Sheriff's Sale by reason of the failure
of the appellant to pay the amount bid by him, to-wit, $1,944,732.86.
The Court stated that it was without jurisdiction in view of the
instant appeal and denied the motion, but on the lower Court's own
motion required the plaintiff to file a supersedeas bond covering
the lien claimants.

The refusal to grant that motion will be the

subject of another appeal by this respondent at least.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE MECHANIC'S LIEN OF RESPONDENT, BLAND BROS .. , INC. IS
ENTITLED TO RELATE BACK TO THE INITIAL WORK DONE
BY RESPONDENT, CHILD BROS., INC,
Two provisions of the Utah Mechanic's Lien Law a9pear to

be determinative of this issue.

Section 38-1-10, Utah Code Anno-

tated, 1953, provides:
"The liens for work and labor done or material
furnished as provided in this chapter shall be upon an
equal footing; regardless of the date of filing the
notice and claim of lien and regardless of the time
of performing such work and labor or furnishing such
material."
Section 38-1-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides:
"The liens herein provided for shall relate back
to, and take effect as of, the time of the commencement
to do work or furnish materials on the ground for the
structure or improvement, and shall have priority over
any lien, mortgage or other encumbrance which may have
have attached subsequently to the time when the building,
improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or
first material furnished on the ground; also over any
lien, mortgage or other encumbrance of which the lien
holder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the
time the building, structure or improvement was commenced, work begun, or first material furnished on
the ground."
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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It thus appears that all who furnish work and

materi~s

on a project have the same priority which dates back to the commencement of the first work by the first laborer or supplier of
materials.

In this case, the first work was commenced by Child

Bros., Inc., on November 15, 1973, and that is the date of priority for all of the respondents.
Appellant attempts to circumvent this result by what
appears to be a misapplication of the holding in Western Mortgage

424 P2d 437. I That case involved a single lot in a subdivision,
and the Supreme Court of Utah held that the mechanic's lien
claimants who had furnished labor and materials on the structure
on that single lot were not entitled to tack on for priority purposes to work which was done elsewhere in the subdivision so as
to take priority over a construction mortgage lender who had
loaned on that specific lot.

The Supreme Court based its opinion

upon the issue of notice stating:
"The problem is one of notice.
The presence of
materials on the building site or evidence on the ground
that work has commenced on a structure or preparatory
thereto is notice to all the world that liens may have
attached.
However, the off-site construction in developing the subdivision for building sites would not
necessarily bring to the attention of a lender that
someone is claiming a lien on a particular lot in
the subdivision."
In the instant case,

~e

are not deal1ng w1th a lender

who has loaned on one single lot, nor even on a series of lots,
and who, therefore, might not be on notice as to the existence
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10-

of prior work.

In the instant case, the initial work by respon-

dent, Child Bros., Inc., applied to the entire subdivision, and
the mortgage of the appellant is a blanket mortgage covering the
entire subdivision.

There is therefore no question that the

appellant was on notice of the work performed by respondent, Child
Bros., Inc.

Furthermore the work performed by respondents was not

limited to one single lot, but rather was labor performed, even
by appellant's own admission, on a very sizeable portion of the
subdivision.
1 and 2.

Appellant admits that work was performed on Phases

However the record does not disclose that the work of

respondents did not take place on even a broader area than is
admitted by the appellant.

So in this case we have the iabor of

of the respondents being performed on a substantial area, including
the same area in which the respondent, Child Bros., Inc., performed
its labor.

On the other hand, in the Western Mortgage case, the

mechanic's lien claimant's labor was performed in a different

~rea

than that in which the initial work was performed, and in fact the
Supreme Court designates it as "off-site".

The instant case there-

fore does not deal with off-site work because the labor was performed by this respondent and by Child Bros., Inc., on the same
site.

This result is not changed even if the facts should show

that the Child Bros., Inc., performed some work in areas in which
this

respondent

did not venture.

The fact nevertheless remains

they all did work in a substantial area together.
Although the appellant does not appear to rely heavily
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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thereon, he does make reference to the fact that there were two
different owners of the property.

We respectfully submit that

that should make no difference in the result in this case. First
of all, it appears that this so-called change of ownership was
largely a technical one because substantially the same persons
remained involved in both the limited partnership and in the
so-called corporation.

Furthermore, the benefits of the Meehan-

ic's Lien Law should not be denied the mechanic's lien claimants
by virtue of change in ownership.

It would appear that the rights

of the mechanic's lien claimants should not be destroyed by the
simple expedient of one owner transferring the property to another
during construction.

Those who bestow honest and diligent labor

on a property should not be deprived of the benefits of the
Mechanic's Lien Law by such a device as a transfer during construction from one owner to another.

That would appear to be

especially so where the transfer is one of form rather than substance.

It should be noted that the language of the Utah Mechanic':

Lien Law states that t..'le lien attaches to the real property and is
thus a right in rem.

See Section 38-l-3, Utah Code Annoted, 1953.

It should also be noted that just as appellant's mortgage was a
blanket mortgage covering the entire tract "physically",
covered the entire project "financially".

it also

That is to say,

there

were not separate loan agreements :or dif:'erent ;:ohases o:: <::"1e ?eject.

The labor of Child Bros. and the other respondents co';ered

the same physical area and ·were all perfor:-:1ed iJUrsuant to

fin'mcl~ 0
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from the same lender, to-wit, the appellant.

The change in

form of ownership from limited partnership to corporation cannot alter the foregoing facts, particularly where substantially
the same personnel are involved.
The case of Aladdin Heating v. Trustees of the Central
States, 563 P2d 82 (1977), cited in appellant's brief, is not in
point because it deals with the situation where there are no
"visible signs of construction to inform prospective lenders
inspecting the premises that liens had attached."

(Page 84)

In the instant case, such visible signs were admittedly on the
property as the result of the work of Child Bros.
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Again, although appellant does not appear to rely
heavily thereon, he does make reference to the fact that Child
Bros., Inc., at one time released its lien.

We think that that

has no significance whatever in this case.

It is undisputed that

Child Bros., Inc., performed its initial labor on the property
commencing November 15, 1973. It is also undisputed that Child
Bros., Inc., performed other services on the premises at other
times subsequent to November 15, 1973.

It should be noted, how-

ever, that even prior to the aforesaid purported release of Child
(R. 4 62)
Bros.' lien which took place on June 22, 1976,/Bland Bros., Inc.,
began March 8, 1976, and
had already completed its labor, which/was completed on May 1,
1976 (R.508).

Thus Bland Bros., Inc., had fully performed its

work two months prior to any release of mortgage by Child Bros.,
Inc.

However, even if Bland Bros., Inc., had performed its work

after Child Bros., Inc., had released their lien, it would appear
that they would still be entitled to the same priority.
Further, in this connection,we cite to the Court the
case of Boise Cascade v. Stephens, 572 P2d 1380 (Utah-1977) .. In
that case the court held that where a materialman furnished his
materials and then signed a release of lien, and then thereafter
furnished further materials, that the priority date of the seconc
series dates back to the date of the first delivery, even though
there has been an intervening lien celease.

That being the ::;ase,

it would appear to be clear that the labor of Bland Bros., Inc.,
performed prior even to such release, would certainly relate back
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to the date of the first delivery of labor and materials on the
subdivision by Child Bros., Inc., to-wit, on November 15, 1973.
In truth, what this case really boils down to is that
appellant erroneously assumed some risk in releasing its first mortgage (Trust Deed).

That first Trust Deed was recorded August 1,

1973 (two and one-half months before Child Bros., Inc., commenced
work) .

Appellant released that Trust Deed and recorded a new one

on February 19, 1974.
priority.

By doing so, they forfeited their first

They were not required to release that first Trust

Deed because the February 1974 transaction was just a refinancing
with the same mortgagor, to-wit, the Zundel Limited Partnership.
The

assigr~ent

to Mountain Springs did not take place until 1975

(see page 2 of appellant's brief).

Appellent attempts now to

avoid the consequences of that error by endeavoring to come within
the ruling in Western Mortgage, supra.

That case

d~es

not cover

the instant fact situation and indeed in fairness to subcontractors, the rule of that case should not be extended to cover a
situation where the lender's Trust Deed covers the entire tract
and the lender is on notice of all work performed anywhere on the
same tract.

Respondents seek only to recover for materials and

labor which they had actually and admittedly furnished on the
project.

Theyshould not be denied a just recovery where the

appellant was on notice of labor on the tract at the time it
recorded its Trust Deed in February 1974.
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POINT II.

THE APPEAL IS MOOT.
The appellant agreed by stipulation to accept the sum

of $1,900,000 even though it claimed that the total amount owing
to it was in excess of that sum.
agreed to bid only that sum.
it states

Pursuant thereto, the appellant

In the summary to appellant's brief,

(page 12) :

"As stated to this court on the argument May 15,
1978, concerning respondents' Motion to Dismiss Appeal,
plaintiff is attempting to obtain payment by redemption
from several prospective buyers for $1,900,000 net to
it, but it is not willing to sell for less than
$1,944,732.86 principal. The additional $44,732.86
will be paid to the junior lien claimants.
If a
developer-investor pays this amount during the period
of redemption, the appeal will become moot."
This is an honorable admission and in keeping with the initial
stipulation of the parties on December 8, 1977.

As heretofore

noted, the appellant agreed not to take a deficiency and is therefore by stipulation entitled at best to $1,900,000.

It was based

upon that agreement that the parties to this action withdrew thei:
claims against the appellant.

Although the appellant only bid

$1,900,000 initially at the Sheriff's Sale, at his own request,
that bid was amended to reflect that it bid $1,944,732.86 for the
property.

The appellant was not compelled to request that amend-

ment to the bidding and was indeed entitled to rely on its bid of
$1,900,000 as it '.vas in keeping •.vith its stipulation.

The :>poelL:.:

could then have appealed the question of priority to the

Suore~e

Court, presumably to have the matter of priorities tested on
appeal.
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The appellant, however, chose not to follow that course
of action.

The appellant bid for the property $1,944,732.86 and in

so doing has rendered the appeal moot because, having bid that
sum, the appellant is required to pay that sum to the Sheriff
pursuant to Rule 69(e) (4) which states:
"Every bid shall be deemed an irrevocable offer;
and if the purchaser refuses to pay the amount bid by
him for the property struck off to him at a sale under
execution, the officer may again sell the property at
any time to the highest bidder, and if any loss is
occasioned thereby, the party refusing to pay, in
addition to being liable on such bid, is guilty of a
contempt of court and may be punished accordingly.
When a purchaser refuses to pay, the officer may also,
in his discretion, thereafter reject any other bid of
such person."
Thus the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and
Order of the Court entered January 16, 1978,

(R.568)

i~

fact the

required

that the purchaser at the sale pay the money to the Sheriff and
from there, into court.

Appellant, having bid $1,944,732.86,

is required to pay that sum to the Sheriff.

Inasmuch as the

first priority claimants only amount to $44,732.86, no one would
object to appellant's not paying the $1,900,000 to which he would
be entitled in his position of second priority, but certainly is
obligated to pay the $44,732.86 which he actually bid.

As a pur-

chaser at the Sheriff's Sale, the appellant is not entitled to
any privileges to which any other purchaser would not be entitled.
Any third person,having bid at the sale, would be required to pay
in the full amount, and appellant is likewise required to pay in
the full amount, at least to the extent of those having priority
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant, having bid that sum in, and saic'l. sum being sufficient
to pay the first and second priorities, we respectfully submit
that the appeal is moot.

Even if the Supreme Court should

reverse the lower court and adjudge that the appellant is entitled
to first priority and the respondents entitled to second priority,
having agreed to accept $1,900,000, appellant is only entitledto
that sum, and the respondents, even in a position of second priority, would be entitled to the excess of the bid made, to-wit,
$44,732.86.

Therefore, no matter how the Supreme Court rules,

there has been sufficient bid to pay both the first priority
and the second priority.
On the last page of appellant's brief, it is conceded
that if, during the redemption period, a redemption for the sum
of $1,944,732.86 is obtained, that "The additional $44,732.86
will be paid to the junior lien claimants."

Appellant goes on

to say however that "if the redemption period expires, plaintiffs
are entitled to the property without obligation to pay the liens
which should be determined to be junior and subordinate to the
first Trust Deed."
The last sentence is not in accord with the stipulation
of December 8, 1977, and furthermore until the bid price of
$1,944,732.86 is actually paid, there can be no expiration of
the redemption period.

Appellant is not entitled to the beneflc

of a termination of the redemption period where it has never pal~
for the property.

Before the so-called expiration of the redempti 21
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period, several of the respondents/petitioned the lower court
to vacate the purported Sheriff's Sale.
do that on the belief

The Court declined to

that it lacked jurisdiction inasmuch as

this appeal was pending.

Failure to grant that relief will be

appealed and presented to this Court in due course.
In this matter, the respondent, Bland Bros., Inc.,
filed a Petition with the Supreme Court to Dismiss the Appeal
of the appellant on the basis that the appellant had (1) stipulated to judgment, and (2) accepted the benefits of the judgment
and could not therefore appeal therefrom.
of this position were:

Cases cited in support

Cornia vs. Cornia, 80 Ut 486, 15 P2d 631

(1932), and Dawson vs. Board of Education of Weber County, 118 Ut
452,

222 P2d 590 (1950).

That matter was heard before the Supreme

Court on briefs submitted by the parties.

The Court denied the

Motion, and respondent will not repeat the arguments at this
point.

Inasmuch as the Supreme Court did not announce any reasons

for denying the Motions, and one can perhaps assume that the said
Motions were denied to enable the Court to become more fully aware
of the circumstances of the appeal. This respondent will, therefore,

adopt

that Motion and the grounds asserted therefor at

this point in the brief.

It would appear that the arguments

there asserted are even more compelling at this point inasmuch
as the appellant has now actually obtained a Sheriff's Deed to
the property, never having paid a single ~ime of the amount bid
by appellant at the Sheriff's Sale.

Appellant thus has the full
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fruits of the Judgment and the Sheriff's Sale without ever
having paid the amount bid.

Further, appellant's counsel has

stated that his client will not now accept $1,944,732.86 for
the property.

When appellant bid that sum, we must assume that

appellant felt that it was getting value for its money, or it
would not have made that bid.

Appellant admits that respondents

were entitled to the $44,732.86 if a third party had bid that soo,
but claims that respondents are not entitled to it where the
appellant bid that sum.

That proposition flies in the face of

the letter and the spirit of the stipulation of December 8, 1977,
expecially where appellant now has the property and refuses to
sell it for the sum of $1,944,732.86.
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POINT III.

THE APPELLANT'S APPEAL IS PREMATURE AND OUT OF TIME.
(R. 631)
In Appellant's Notice of Appeal,/he appeals from the

"Order Granting Summary Judgment and Order Amending Certificate
of Sale in favor of the defendant-lien claimants

Duncan Electric

Supply, Robert J. Wardrop, Countertop Shop, Inc., Max D. Scheel,
Ronald Graham Tile Co., Bland Bros., Inc., and Child Bros., Inc.,
which Order granted the lien claimants priority over plaintiffs •
Trust Deed lien. "

The only order in the file bearing that heading

and relating to those defendants is the Order of the Court entered
(R.618)
on February 1, 1978.; That Order, however, did not adjudge the priority of defendant, Holt-Witmer Interiors, and the prior:i.ty of
that defendant was adjudged and included in the Amended Order and
Decision of the Court entered February 22, 1978 (R.629).

There

is a rather indefinite reference to Holt-Witmer in an Motion and
Order of February 16, 1978 (R.627-628).

Furthermore, an Order

dismissing Crossclaims against C. N. Zundel and Associates and
C. N.

Zundel, with prejudice, was entered on February 7, 1978,

(R.633-635)

and the final order in the file was entered on March 6,

1978, which dismissed certain crossclaims and counterclaims, and
continued certain crossclaims and counterclaims without date. (R.645)
It thus appears that until the adjudication regarding
Holt-Witmer, which was entered February 22, 1978, the case was
still pending in the lower court and prior orders were not final,
including the Order of February l, 1978.

Not being final, said
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Orders were not appealable.

In fact it appears that at least

until March 6, 1978, the matter was still pending in the lower
court, and no prior orders were final and appealable.

The Court

nowhere made the finding required by Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, that "there is no

just reason for delay and

upon an express direction for the entry of judgment".

It would

thus appectr that at least until March 6, 1978, substantial issues
remained to be decided, and therefore no prior orders were final.
Even the matter of the lien claimants was not determined totally
until the Order of February 22, 1978.

It thus appears that the

attempt of appellant to appeal from the February l, 1978, was
abortive. Even if the Order of February 22, 1978, is deemed final,
it was not appealed from by the appellant.

It thus appears ines-

capable that where at least four separate orders were entered after
February l, 1978, that Order cannot be deemed a final order and
one which is appealable to this Court.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent, Bland Bros., Inc., respectfully submits
that the decision of the lower court should be affirmed, or in
the alternative, the appeal should be dismissed as being moot
and premature.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
GORDON A. MADSEN
Attorneys for Respondent,
Bland Bros., Inc.
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

